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EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP 
PLANS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS 
Luis L. Granados* 
The Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") has become 
an important and controversial technique of corporate planning 
since it first gained widespread popular attention. 1 The recent 
experience of one company provides a good illustration. In 1975, 
the South Bend Lathe Company stood on the. brink of being liq-
uidated by its parent corporation after a series of loss years. Five 
hundred people would have lost their jobs upon liquidation of 
the company. But an Economic Development Administration 
loan enabled the employees to set up an ESOP to purchase the 
assets of the division and create a one hundred percent em-
ployee-owned corporation. Productivity shot up immediately, 
the company began turning a profit, and the national media 
heaped praise on what quickly became the greatest ESOP suc-
cess story}1 Internal problems developed over the years, however, 
in spite of the company's generally good business performance. 
In the summer of 1980, the national media, which had originally 
sung the praises of the South Bend Lathe ESOP, chortled when 
the South Bend Lathe employee-owners "hit the bricks" in a 
protracted and bitter strike. 8 
The South Bend Lathe strike provided ammunition to the 
critics who question the purported value of ESOP's in improving 
employee productivity. These critics label the ESOP a "fable" 
and charge that it harms employers, employees, and the govern-
ment's ability to raise revenue without producing the positive 
results intended by its establishment.' Advocates, however, 
• Legislative Counsel, The ESOP Association of America. The opinions expressed in 
this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of The ESOP 
Association of America. 
' The first law specifically referring to the ESOP was the Regional Rail Reorganization 
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 102(5), 87 Stat. 985 (1973). 
• See, e.g., Ryan, How and Why U.S. Helped 500 Workers Take Ouer a Machine-Tool 
Manufacturer, Wall St. J., August 16, 1976, at 28, col. 1. 
• See, e.g., Trouble in Workers' Paradises, TIME, Sept. 22, 1980, at 73. 
• See, e.g., Subcommittee on Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Committee on Em-
ployee Benefits, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, ESOP's Foibles, 31 TAX 
LAWYER 561 (1978). 
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· claim that the ESOP has the potential to revolutionize the 
American free enterprise system by establishing it upon a basis 
of true justice and efficiency.5 
This article surveys the battle between the critics and advo-
cates of the ESOP, and scrutinizes various proposals currently 
being considered in the legislative arena. Part I examines the 
philosophy and history of the ESOP, particularly focusing upon 
the conceptual foundations provided by the writings of Louis 
Kelso. Part II explicates the various functions performed by the 
ESOP: as a tool of corporate finance, as an "in-house" market 
for the sale of stock held by a company's shareholders, and as a 
means of obtaining additional investment tax credit. Part III 
analyzes critically six proposed improvements of the ESOP sys-
tem from both the General Accounting Office's Report and the 
proposed ESOP Improvements Act. This Part concludes that 
while each of the six proposals has some merit, the effectiveness 
of the proposals is limited by their failure to deal with more 
than the tax aspects of the ESOP controversy. 
I. THE PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF THE ESOP 
A. The Philosophy Behind the ESOP 
Although the origins of the ESOP philosophy can be traced 
back to the 19th Century writings of Johann Heinrich von 
Thunen,6 the generally-recognized creator of the concept today 
is the lawyer-economist Louis 0. Kelso. Kelso's Two-Factor 
Theory: The Economics of Reality examines the production of 
economic wealth,' arguing that there are two factors at work in 
the production of goods and services: (1) an individual's labor, 
and (2) physical tools, or capital. A machine which manufactures 
widgets "produces" them in the same physical, legal, and moral 
sense as a person who fashions them laboriously by hand. Natu-
rally, the machine does not do all the work itself; at the very 
• See, e.g., Note, Employee Stock Ownership PlallS: A Step Toward Democratic Capi-
talism, 55 B.U.L. REV. 195 (1975); Maxa, Can We All Own a Piece of the Rock?,"Wash. 
Post, Dec. 10, 1978, (Magazine) at 4. 
6 Employee Stock Ownership PlallS and General Stock Ownership Trusts, Hearings 
on S. 3241, S. 3223, H.R. 13882 before the Senate Finance Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
531 (1978) (statement of Bert Metzger). 
, L. KELSO & P. HETTER, Two-FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF REALITY (1967). 
See also L. KELSO & M. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958); L. KELSO & M. 
ADLER, THE NEW CAPITALISTS (1961). 
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least, a person is needed to turn it on. The machine, however, is 
a separate, identifiable factor in the production of the widget. 
Kelso's view contrasts directly with that of Karl Marx, who said 
that labor is the only factor of production, and who viewed ma-
chines merely as "congealed labor."8 This difference is of more 
than mere academic importance. The Kelsonian view leads to 
the conclusion that the owner of the machine is justly entitled to 
the wealth the machine creates, while Marx would say that the 
laborers who built the machine are the ones who should receive 
the wealth it creates. In a society where we have machines which 
produce machines which produce still other machines, the "con-
gealed labor" viewpoint leads to hopeless complication, and to 
many observers lacks the common sense of the two-factor view. 
Assuming for the moment that there are two factors of pro-
duction, the next question concerns their relative importance. 
Kelso argues persuasively that the Industrial Revolution must 
be defined in terms of the steady shifting away from the labor 
factor and toward the capital factor. While exact quantification 
of the two factors' relative contribution is impossible, Kelso real-
istically estimates that as much as ninety percent of the work of 
production is properly attributable to the capital side. If the 
number of man-hours required to produce most goods and ser-
vices without the benefit of modern technology were calculated 
and compared with the number of man-hours presently re-
quired, in many cases the ninety percent figure would seem con-
servative. In any event, Kelso is almost certainly right that the 
trend of modern technological development is toward an ever-
increasing role for the capital factor. 
The fundamental contradiction in our economy, Kelso further 
argues, is that our outtake system is "out of synch" with the 
realities of our input system. The vast majority of people derive 
their income almost solely from their contribution of labor, own-
ing virtually no capital whatsoever. If there are truly two factors 
of production and capital is in fact the ever-increasing factor, 
and if the vast majority of participants in the economy are rele-
gated to deriving their income from the ever-diminishing factor 
of production, then it is little wonder that we have an economy 
racked by tensions and periodic breakdowns. 
There is no question but that the ownership of American capi-
tal is concentrated in the hands of the few. Federal government 
figures show that one percent of the American people own over 
fifty percent of privately-held corporate wealth, while six per-
• Kelso, Karl Marx: The Almost Capitalist, 43 A.B.A.J. 235 (1957). 
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cent of the people own over seventy percent of it. 9 There is also 
no question that this maldistribution causes much of the social 
difficulty in America today. Kelso's and Marx's differing views 
on the nature of production lead them to differing views on the 
resolution of the maldistribution problem. Marx would expropri-
ate capital property (away) from present owners, because he 
does not concede their right to own it. Marx would ultimately 
abolish the concept of property itself. Kelso, on the other hand, 
says that the solution lies not in destroying the institution of 
private property, but in spreading it out. Kelso maintains that 
this should not be done by confiscating from the haves and giv-
ing to the have nots, since that would be inconsistent with his 
view that property owners have a genuine right to their prop-
erty. Instead, he focuses on the ownership of the future capital 
wealth society will produce.10 Virtually all of this growth is 
financed by some variety of credit. Therefore, Kelso and his as-
sociates have devised various credit mechanisms which foster 
broad ownership of newly-created wealth by average citizens, to 
replace or at least supplement present mechanisms, which tend 
to concentrate the ownership of new wealth into the hands of 
the existing ownership base. The ESOP represents the most 
well-known of the Kelsonian mechanisms. 
B. The History of the ESOP 
The concept of broad ownership of productive capital runs 
through the writings of the leading thinkers of the American 
Revolution, and through the land policies of the first hundred 
years of the nation's existence.11 The Revenue Act of 192112 first 
recognized the tax exempt status of stock bonus plans; five years 
later, the tax exempt status of pension plans was similarly recog-
nized.18 The Internal Revenue Service, in a 1953 Revenue Rul-
ing, 14 first allowed leveraging by a stock bonus plan to provide 
the employer with financing repayable with pretax corporate 
9 STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., BROADENING THE OWN-
ERSHIP OF NEW CAPITAL: ESOP's AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES 7 (Comm. Print 1976). 
10 The Department of Commerce estimates that between $3 and $5 trillion of such 
growth will be needed in the next decade. See U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REPORT, May 27, 
1974, at 22-23. 
11 See, e.g., Act to Secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers on the Public Domain, 12 
Stat. 392 (1862). 
11 § 219(0, 42 Stat. 227, 247 (1921). 
13 Revenue Act of 1926, § 219(0, 44 Stat. 9, 33, 34 (1926). 
14 Rev. Rul. 46, 1953-1 C.B. 287. 
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dollars, laying the groundwork for the leveraged ESOP. 
Kelso established his first ESOP in 1956, in order to save a 
small newspaper from takeover by a national chain. Over the 
next few years, the number of ESOP's grew very slowly, due to 
unfamiliarity with the idea in business circles. 
The much-needed breakthrough finally came in late 1973 
when Kelso "converted" Senate Finance Committee Chairman 
Russell Long. The Senator immediately pushed through an 
amendment to the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973-a 
response to the collapse of the Penn Central-which would have 
provided for employee ownership of the newly-created Conrail 
Corporation. The bill as amended cleared the full Senate, but 
the Conference Committee diluted the ESOP amendment to a 
mere study, 111 which ultimately rejected the idea as impractical.16 
In 1974, a threat arose to the existence of the ESOP. The orig-
inal versions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA") would have prohibited an employer corporation from 
extending its credit to an ESOP Trust to enable it to obtain a 
loan for the purpose of acquiring employer securities.17 This pro-
vision would have effectively eliminated the leveraged ESOP. 
Senator Long, however, succeeded in amending this section of 
ERISA to provide an exception for ESOP's.18 Also in 1974, Sen-
ator Long amended the Trade Act to require a preference for 
ESOP firms in the government's efforts to assist firms in foreign 
trade impacted industries. Finally, Long continued his efforts in 
1975 by championing the Tax Reduction Act Stock Ownership 
Plan ("TRASOP") in the Tax Reduction Act of that year. The 
1976 Internal Revenue Service's proposed ESOP regulations19 
posed another threat: ESOP advocates claimed that the ex-
tremely restrictive regulations would have a "chilling effect" on 
the establishment of ESOP's. Congress, however, publicly re-
buked the IRS for attempting to frustrate congressional intent,20 
and spelled out exactly what form Congress wanted the regula-
'" See H.R. REP. No. 93-744, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in (1973) U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3306, 3310. 
•• Joint Economic Committee, Hearings on Employee Stock Ownership Plans Before 
the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-73 (1975). But see id. at 264-355 
(rebuttal by L. Kelso and N. Kurland). 
17 S. 1179, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973). 
18 I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3). 
•• Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 54.4975-7(b), 54.4975-11, 41 Fed. Reg. 31,833 (1976). See· also 
Department of Labor Prop. Reg. §§ 2550.407d-6, 2550.408b-3, 41 Fed. Reg. 31,870 (1976). 
All four proposed regulations were later adopted with substantial amendments. See 
Treas. Reg. §§ 54.4975-7(b), 54.4975-11 (1980), and 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.408b-3, .407d-5, 
.407d-6 (1979). 
•• See note 23 infra. 
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tions to take. 21 The final regulations largely adhered to these 
recommendations. In a Revenue Ruling in 1979, moreover, the 
IRS took the significant step of recognizing the ESOP as a 
"technique of corporate finance. "22 
The ESOP concept appears frequently in current legislation. 
Besides technical amendments,28 there is a growing trend in 
Congress to tie federal aid to businesses to the establishment of 
ESOP programs. For example, the controversial Chrysler bailout 
bill24 and the 1979 legislation authorizing federal funding for 
Conrail and the Delaware & Hudson Railway211 required estab-
lishment of an ESOP as a condition of federal assistance. The 
Small Business Employee Ownership Act of 1980 authorizes the 
Small Business Administration ("SBA") to provide loan guaran-
tees to ESOP's for financing corporate growth;26 the Act also ex-
pands on the SBA's loan authority by permitting loan guaran-
tees to ESOP's for the purpose of acquiring fifty-one percent 
control of a company. Further, the 1980 authorization bills for 
the Economic Development Administration ("EDA")27 would 
have established a preference for ESOP projects in the alloca-
tion of EDA funds. 28 Finally, some states have attempted to en-
courage the growth of ESOP's. The states of Delaware, Mary-
land, Michigan and Minnesota have enacted legislation 
favorable to the ESOP concept.29 Maryland's "Broadened Own-
ership Act," for example, establishes support for the ESOP as 
official state economic policy, and requires several state agencies 
to report annually on their progress in implementing the policy. 
Although states have moved into this area, most ESOP develop-
ment will undoubtedly occur within the federal arena. 
21 H.R. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 539 (1976), reprinted in (1976) U.S. 
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEws 4118, 4234. 
•• Rev. Rul. 79-122, 1979-1 C.B. 204, 206. 
•• The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978), and the Techni-
cal Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, 94 Stat. 194 (1980), made a number of 
technical modifications in the law relating to ESOP's. More technical amendments may 
be added by the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1980). 
•• Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1980). 
•• Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 95-611, 92 Stat. 3089 (1978). 
21 Pub. L. No. 96-302, 94 Stat. 833 (1980). 
•• See The ESOP Association of America Newsletter, Nov. 1980, at 3. 
•• Id. 
•• 1979 Del. Laws J. Res. 20; 1979 Md. Laws J. Res. 1; 1980 Md. Laws, chs. 119, 598, 
821, and 847; MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.751 (1980 Supp.); Act of March 15, 1974, ch. 
157, 1974 Minn. Laws 233 (codified in scattered sections of MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 290.01 -
92.04 (West 1967)). 
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II. THE ESOP SYSTEM 
21 
Kelso and his associates have developed many new forms of 
credit mechanisms to spread out the ownership of newly-formed 
capital; the most well-known by far is the ESOP. The ESOP 
gives a corporation's employees shares of stock in their employer 
without requiring them to put up their own money for it. That 
sounds like a giveaway, but it is not. Capital, unlike consumer 
goods and services, pays for itself. As one of the two factors 
which produces wealth, capital generates income. That income is 
generally sufficient to repay the cost of acquiring the capital 
within three to seven years. Responsible corporate managers 
generally do not undertake capital projects unless they have 
solid reason to believe that the project will pay for itself in that 
amount of time. Thus, the ESOP is not a "giveaway"; the em-
ployees simply "pay for" the capital out of the earnings the capi-
tal itself generates. In other words, they "earn" their capital 
accumulations by gaining access to the flow of future profits to 
pay the cost of the capital being acquired. 
In technical terms, an ESOP is a "stock bonus" plan, or a 
"stock bonus" plan combined with a "money purchase" plan, 
"qualified" under the Internal Revenue Code. A "stock bonus" 
plan is simply a plan for compensating employees with stock in-
stead of with cash; a "money purchase" plan is a plan in which 
the employer contributes annually a fixed percentage of the em-
ployee's annual compensation. 30 "Qualified" means that the plan 
complies with the participation, vesting, distribution, fiduciary 
responsibility, reporting and disclosure, etc., rules of ERISA81 
and Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. Corporate contri-
butions to stock bonus plans are deductible by the corporation;32 
employees are not taxed until they receive their benefits, usually 
at retirement or other termination of employment. 33 ERISA 
provides elaborate rules for all stock bonus and other types of 
deferred compensation plans to follow, in order to protect the 
interests of employees. 
ao 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-l(b)(l)(iii) (1980). 
11 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.)• 
[hereinafter cited as "ERISA"]. 
11 I.R.C. § 404. 
11 I.R.C. § 402. 
22 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 14 
A. The Functions of the ESOP 
The ESOP is a specialized type of stock bonus plan, because 
ESOP's are permitted to borrow money to buy employer stock, 
and the employer is permitted to guarantee such loans. 34 The 
ESOP, while a very flexible device, has three principal functions: 
(1) as a tool of corporate finance, often called the "leveraged 
ESOP," whose distinguishing feature is the borrowing of funds 
by the employee Trust to purchase newly-issued equity of the 
employer company; (2) as an "in-house" market for the stock of 
closely-held companies; and (3) as a means of obtaining an addi-
tional one and one-half percent Investment Tax Credit, in addi-
tion to the basic credit of ten percent of corporate investment in 
"qualified" plant and equipment, as defined in Sections 46 
through 50 of the Internal Revenue Code. ESOP's which take 
advantage of the Investment Tax Credit provisions are often 
called "TRASOP's," for "Tax Reduction Act [of 1975) Stock 
Ownership Plan." 
1. The ESOP as a tool of corporate finance-A hypothetical 
example might help explain the finance function of the ESOP. 
Suppose Corporation X wants to build a new plant for $10 mil-
lion. Under conventional debt financing, it would simply borrow 
the $10 million, provide sufficient guarantee of repayment to 
satisfy the lender, use the money to build the plant, and then 
use the profits from the new plant to pay back the lender. The 
excess of the profits generated by the new plant over the pay-
ments made to amortize the loan makes the deal attractive to 
the corporation. 
ESOP financing adds a third entity to the transaction-an 
ESOP Trust. The Trust, not the corporation, borrows the money 
from the lender; the corporation guarantees that it will make 
payments to the Trust in amounts sufficient to amortize the 
loan. The Trust then uses the borrowed funds to purchase 
newly-issued shares of employer stock, at fair market value as 
determined by a qualified appraiser. That gets the money into 
Corporation X, which uses it to build the new plant. The new 
plant generates profits, which are used by Corporation X to 
make payments to the Trust, which immediately uses the money 
to repay its obligation to the lender. The payment schedule from 
the Corporation to the Trust may be essentially the same as it 
~ would be directly to the lender under conventional debt financ-
u I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3). 
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ing. 311 The corporate obligation is essentially the same whether or 
not ESOP financing is used. 
There is one big difference, however. In conventional debt 
financing, debt repayments attributable to interest are deducti-
ble for tax purposes, but amounts attributable to repayment of 
principal are not. All payments to the ESOP are deductible, 
however, even those attributable to principal repayments.36 This 
makes quite a difference: given a fifty percent effective tax rate, 
Corporation X will have to gross $20 million to repay the $10 
million principal of the conventional loan, but need gross only 
$10 million to repay the loan with pretax dollars through the 
ESOP. That difference, plus the productivity improvements that 
frequently accompany the ESOP, make the ESOP route seem 
safer and more attractive from the lender's standpoint, and may 
in some cases lead to faster amortization of the loan. 37 
The employees of Corporation X receive their stock interests 
according to the elaborate rules of ERISA and Subchapter D of 
the Internal Revenue Code. First, the employee must become a 
"participant" in the plan. 38 This is generally accomplished by 
meeting the requirements specified in the plan, which may re-
quire up to one year 9f service and/or the attainment of age 
twenty-five. (In most cases, the Corporation may exclude part-
time employees from participation). Each year, the stock or cash 
that has been contributed to the Trust ( except for that which 
has been debt-financed and not yet "paid for") is "allocated" to 
the separate accounts of each participant. When the Trust has 
acquired the stock with the proceeds of a loan, the stock is only 
allocated to individual accounts as the loan is paid off; e.g., when 
ten percent of the loan is repaid, ten percent of the stock is "re-
leased" for allocation. 39 This allocation is normally made propor-
tionate to employee compensation, so that an employee who 
earns $20,000 per year will receive an allocation twice as large as 
an employee who earns $10,000 per year. The employee, how-
ever, is not fully entitled to his or her entire account. The pro-
•• Conrad, ESOP: Finance Tool, Employee Benefit, Pensions and Investments, Sept. 
25, 1978, at 33, col. 1. 
ae I.R.C. § 404(a). 
37 If new stock has been issued, on the other hand, there will be a dilutive effect to the 
calculation of earnings per share, since there will be an increase in the number of shares 
outstanding which forms the denominator for the ratio. Whether or not this dilutive 
effect will actually reduce the earnings per share from the pre-ESOP period depends 
upon the rate of increase in company earnings-the numerator of the ratio-resulting 
from the new investment . 
.. I.R.C. § 410. 
•• Pension Excise Taxes, 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-7(b)(8) (1980). 
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portion to which the employee is entitled is determined by the 
"vesting" schedule:'0 There are a wide range of options for per-
missible vesting schedules, which can delay one hundred percent 
vesting for up to fifteen years. In a typical plan, an employee 
will be zero percent vested for his first three years of employ-
ment. After the third year the employee will become thirty per-
cent vested, after the fourth year forty percent vested, up to the 
tenth year, after which he or she will be one hundred percent 
vested, or fully entitled to the stock which has been accumulat-
ing in his account each year. When the employees leave the com-
pany, they have the right to the value of the vested portion of 
their account. They also have the right to demand the actual 
shares,•1 although in most closely-held companies both the em-
ployee and the employer prefer a distribution of the fair market 
value of the shares in cash instead. If the employee does receive 
shares, which are not of a type traded actively in securities mar-
kets, ESOP regulations guarantee a put-option to sell them back 
to the company or the Trust for their fair market value, which 
the company or Trust is permitted to pay in installments over a 
five-year period.42 The employee is not taxed on the allocation or 
vesting of shares in his or her account, but is taxed at the time 
of distribution, unless the employee immediately "rolls over" 
the distribution into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA).48 
Special ten-year income averaging is also available for lump-sum 
distributions. 44 
While the stock is held in the Trust, any dividends paid on it 
can immediately be "passed through" to the employees to pro-
vide them with additional income. Alternatively, they can be 
used to accelerate repayment of the loan, or used within the 
Trust to purchase stock or other investments for purposes of li-
quidity.•11 In the case of a leveraged ESOP, voting rights on pub-
licly-traded shares must be "passed through" to participants-in 
the words of the statute, each participant in the plan must be 
"entitled to direct the plan as to the manner in which employer 
securities ... are to be voted." For non-publicly traded shares, 
it is only necessary to pass through the voting rights "with re-
spect to a corporate matter which (by law or charter) must be 
decided by more than a majority vote of outstanding common 
•• I.R.C. § 411. 
0 I.R.C. § 409A(h). 
•• Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(10) to (11) (1980). 
0 1.R.C. § 402(a)(5). 
•• I.R.C. § 402(e)(l). 
•• Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 803(h), 90 Stat. 1520, 1590. 
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shares voted." Such issues are typically "major" issues, such as 
merger, liquidation, etc.46 
2. The ESOP: "in-house" market-With or without leverag-
ing, an ESOP can be used as an "in-house market" for the sale 
of stock held by a company's shareholders. Owners of closely-
held companies often have a difficult time finding a buyer for 
their shares when they want to retire. An ESOP can be used to 
create a buyer, keep the corporation in friendly hands, and boost 
productivity-all at the same time.'" 
Suppose the sole owner of Corporation X wants to convert 
shares to cash over a period of years in anticipation of retire-
ment. One course of action would be to sell out to a conglomer-
ate, which has drawbacks that are by now well-known.48 An al-
ternative would be to establish an ESOP, according to the rules 
described above. The Corporation would contribute cash each 
year to the ESOP, which would use the cash to purchase shares 
from the owner at fair market value. The owner is taxed at regu-
lar capital gains rates; by contrast, had the stock been sold di-
rectly back to the corporation, the owner may be taxed at much 
higher dividend rates. 49 The owner need not pass through voting 
rights except on extraordinary corporate issues, thus retaining 
control of the company through his or her own stock plus the 
right to select the trustees. If the owner wishes to sell out before 
the Trust has sufficient money to pay him, the ESOP can simply 
borrow the money to pay the owner with the corporation guar-
anteeing the loan. 
3. Tax Reduction Act Stock Ownership Plan-Some of the 
three to four thousand companies which have established 
ESOP's have taken advantage of a provision of the Tax Reduc-
tion Act of 1975 to create something called a "TRASOP."60 That 
provision has now been codified as Section 409A of the Internal 
Revenue Code, and the name of the plan has been officially 
changed to "Tax Credit Employee Stock Ownership Plan," al-
though use of the term TRASOP persists. 61 This provision per-
mits companies to take an additional one percent investment tax 
•• I.R.C. § 409A(e) . 
., See SENATE FINANCE COMM., 96TH CONG. 2D SEss., EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP 
PLANS: AN EMPLOYER HANDBOOK 23 (Comm. Print 1980) . 
•• See HOUSE SMALL BUSINESS COMM., CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: THEIR EFFECTS ON 
SMALL Bus1NEss AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES, H.R. REP. No. 96-1447, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1980). 
•• The seller must comply with the requirements of Rev. Proc. 77-30 to qualify for 
capital gains treatment. See 1977-2 C.B. 539. 
00 Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301(d), 89 Stat. 38 (1975). 
61 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763. 
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credit for money or stock contributed to an ESOP (in lieu of 
taking the deduction; a company cannot take both). That is, if a 
company purchases property qualified for the investment tax 
credit, and if it contributes employer securities to an ESOP as 
defined in Section 409A, it can take an investment tax credit of 
eleven percent, rather than the normal ten percent, of the quali-
fied investments. Furthermore, the company can take yet an ad-
ditional one-half percent credit, for a total of eleven and one-
half percent, to the extent that participants make voluntary 
matching contributions to the Trust. This is very attractive to 
companies eligible for the investment tax credit, because it is 
essentially a free gift from the taxpayers to their employees. 
Many ESOP proponents admit that this is an expensive and 
inefficient way to promote the ESOP concept, but it has at least 
accomplished its purpose of generating interest in the idea, as 
well as providing additional incentive for capital formation. 
TRASOP's are subject to several restrictions not imposed on 
other ESOP's, such as a rule requiring immediate one hundred 
percent vesting. 
Ill. f>ROP0SED IMPROVEMENTS OF THE ESOP SYSTEM 
A. The General Accounting Office Report · 
The General Accounting Office ("GAO"), at the request of the 
Senate Finance Committee, conducted a study of the operation 
of ESOP's. The GAO issued a highly negative report in June, 
1980, entitled Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Who Benefits 
Most in Closely Held Companies?53 The study covered thirteen 
unnamed closely-held government contractor corporations that 
had set up ESOP's, (although there is reason to believe that 
some of the plans studied were not actually statutory ESOP's),C18 
concluding that the interests of ESOP participants were ad-
versely affected in several ways. First, the companies sold or 
contributed stock to their ESOP's at inflated prices, based on 
appraisal valuations that lacked independence and/or did not 
properly consider all relevant factors. Overvaluation of stock is 
•• THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWN-
ERSHIP PLANS: WHO BENEFITS MOST IN CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES? (HRD-80-88) (1980). 
•• Id. at 22. Only 2 of the 13 plans studied contained the put option requirement 
mandatory for all statutory ESOP's. This leads many observers to believe that the other 
11 plans were simply conventional stock bonus plans. 
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prohibited by ERISA,t~" tending to mislead participants about 
the true value of their accounts. The report noted that the fail-
ure of the Department of Labor to publish valuation regulations 
as contemplated by ERISA had contributed to the problem. Sec-
ond, participants were generally not permitted to vote or direct 
the voting of company stock allocated to their ESOP accounts. 
The Rep9rt recommended legislation to require a full "pass-
through" of voting rights on stock allocated to participant's 
accounts. 
Third, participants were not assured of a market for company 
stock distributed by the ESOP. The possibility arose that em-
ployees might be given stock which became useless to them be-
cause they would be unable to find a buyer for it. The Report 
recommended legislation to require plan provisions for 
mandatory put-options, at fair market value, to be issued for all 
company stock distributed from the plan. GAO also questioned 
the contribution that ESOP's make to improving productivity, 
called for a more vigorous program of ESOP audits, and in gen-
eral implied that the whole ESOP concept is not worth the reve-
nue loss it causes. Critics of the Report questioned both the 
methodology employed and the objectivity of its standards of 
evaluation.IHI Many of the GAO criticisms, however, point to 
problems with current ESOP law which _deserve discussion. 
1. The valuation of employer stock-The value assigned to 
employer stock contributed or sold to an ESOP is critically im-
portant. If the ESOP trustee causes the plan to purchase stock 
at a price greater than its true value, the purchase may be a 
violation of fiduciary duties, rendering the trustee personally lia-
ble to the plan participants.66 If the employer contributes stock 
to an ESOP and claims a deduction117 based on an inflated price, 
then the deduction will in part be disallowed. If the ESOP 
purchases stock from a principal shareholder or the employer at 
a price greater than fair market value, the seller is subject to an 
excise tax of five percent of the amount involved;_ an additional 
tax of one hundred percent is imposed if the transaction is not 
"corrected."H Undervaluation can be as bad as overvaluation. 
The law requires that for a leveraged ESOP, terminating partici-
04 ERISA, supra note 31, § 408(e)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(d) (1976). 
"" Memorandum from Ronald L. Ludwig, Chairman, Legal Advisory-Committee, The 
ESOP Association of America, to Sen. Russell B. Long, July 16, 1980 (on file at Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) . 
.. ERISA, supra note 31, §§ 404, 409, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1109 (1976) . 
., I.R.C. § 404(a) . 
.. I.RC. § 4975(a)-(b). 
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pants be given a put-option to sell the shares they receive back 
to the employer or the plan at "fair market value."69 If the se-
curities are undervalued, then the participant may have a cause 
of action against the plan. 
The law provides little guidance to the closely-held company 
on how to value its stock for purposes of ESOP transactions. For 
publicly-traded companies, the market price of the stock on the 
appropriate day is the readily determinable measure of value.80 
But closely-held companies are given only the guidance of 
ERISA Section 3(18)B defining "adequate consideration" for 
prohibited transaction purposes as "the fair market value of the 
asset as determined in good faith by the trustee or named fiduci-
ary pursuant to the terms of the plan and in accordance with 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary." These regulations, 
however, have not yet been proposed, and their proposal does 
not seem to be imminent. 
This lack of standards puts ESOP companies in a predica-
ment. Although today in practice a good faith independent ap-
praisal will provide a certain degree of protection from liability, 
employers still face legal sanctions if their valuation is too low, 
and even stiffer sanctions if it is too high. Appraisers, while 
roundly criticized by the GAO for failing to value stock properly, 
have never been told what standards they are expected to apply. 
Audits and lawsuits focusing on valuation have begun to prolif-
erate, and the resulting confusion and uncertainty act as a deter-
rent to businessmen considering establishment of an ESOP. 
In the absence of the promised ESOP valuation regulations, 
practitioners have been relying on Revenue Ruling 59-60, which 
discusses valuation of closely-held stock for estate and gift tax 
purposes. As one valuation expert has aptly put it, this ruling is 
"more philosophical than instructional. "81 It defines fair market 
value as "the price at which the property would change hands 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller when the former is 
not under any compulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable 
knowledge of the relevant facts," and it lists eight factors which 
should be considered in the computation. 82 
•• Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(ll)(iii) (1980). 
•• ERISA, supra note 31, § 3(18)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1976). 
•• EBPR Research Reports, vol. 28, no. 40, October 3, 1980 (Weekly News Digest), at 6 
(statement of M. Lee). 
•• Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. The eight factors are: 
(a) The nature of the business and history of the enterprise from its inception. 
(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the spe-
cific industry in particular. 
(c) The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business. 
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The GAO Report described several cases in which the valua-
tion of stock transferred to an ESOP could be questioned.88 In 
some instances, no one made an independent appraisal, and the 
Board of Directors or some other interested party simply deter-
mined the valuation. In others, the GAO faulted the valuation 
for failure to consider properly the relevant factors of Revenue 
Ruling 59-60. One appraiser computed company earnings after 
deleting the effect of a subsidiary for which the parent company 
acted as guarantor to all debt and the subsidiary's entire line of 
credit. Other appraisers used inconsistent approaches in differ-
ent companies, such as capitalizing pretax earnings for some 
companies and post-tax earnings for others, or capitalizing earn-
ings before ESOP contributions in some cases, and after ESOP 
contributions in others. One appraiser utilized four different 
methods in four different years for the same company; a subse-
quent IRS-sponsored appraisal concluded that the value in one 
of the years had been overstated by 632 percent. 
In response to these valuation irregularities, GAO called on 
the Department of Labor to issue valuation regulations "as soon 
as possible."84 This suggestion has merit, as it would help to re-
move a cloud of uncertainty from the valuation area. But the 
content of such regulations is, of course, at least as important as 
the fact of their issuance. A poorly-designed set of regulations 
for valuations of ESOP stock would make the ESOP a highly 
unattractive tool for business planning; moreover, the 1976 atti-
tude of the agencies to the ESOP concept raises fears about 
future valuation regulations. If the Kelsonian vision of broad 
private ownership is to be achieved, these valuation regulations 
must be fair to ESOP companies and easily adminis-
tered-otherwise, the growth of the ESOP will be slowed or 
halted. 
Fairness requires that the regulations not result in an under-
valuation of an ESOP company's stock. There are numerous 
ways in which this could happen, a full discussion of which 
would exceed the scope of this article. But one example would 
Id. 
(d) The earnings capacity of the company. 
(e) The dividend-paying capacity. 
(0 Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value. 
(g) Sales of the stock and the size of the bloc to be valued. 
(h) The market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or a similar 
line of business having their stocks actively traded in a free and open market, 
either on an exchange or over-the-counter. 
•• GAO report, supra note 52, at 8-21. 
14 Id. at 19 .. 
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be the treatment of minority vs. majority voting blocs. Some val-
uation experts argue that where the ESOP only controls a mi-
nority interest in a firm, the value of the stock it holds should be 
discounted by some arbitrary percentage to reflect this lack of 
control.611 Others contend that there should be a "premium" for 
a controlling interest over and above the "straight" value of the 
stock, rather than a discount for a minority interest,66 or that 
there should be no adjustment at all based on the proportion of 
shares held. Insofar as the multiplier used in the capitalization 
of earnings approach is based on the price/earnings ratios of 
similar but publicly-traded companies, it seems that the "minor-
ity discount" approach would lead to inaccuracies, when the 
stock being traded is all held by minority interests. The impor-
tant point is to keep in mind the congressional intent to en-
courage ESOP's in conjunction with important public policy rea-
sons for doing so. Furthermore, the drafters should recognize 
that erring on the side of undervaluation does not protect the 
interests of employees. An employee who receives a put-option 
to sell stock back to the company at a price lower than the stock 
is actually worth has not been protected very well. 
Fairness does not represent the only goal that the drafters 
should keep in mind. Simplicity and ease of application are also 
critically important. In the majority bloc vs. minority bloc issue 
discussed above, simplicity would dictate that neither a pre-
mium nor a discount should be applied. Valuation is an art more 
than it is an exact science, and as such it can be debated end-
lessly. But businessmen have no time for endless debate, nor can 
they often afford to pay for a valuation study so thorough as to 
mute all questioning and criticism. Businessmen need a readily 
ascertainable number they can use to determine whether the 
ESOP makes sense for the situation they are in; if they cannot 
get such a number, however, they will lose interest in the ESOP. 
This concern seems particularly important for small 
businesses. 67 
•• Address by J. Zukin, speech outline printed in course materials prepared for Ge-
orgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education Program, ESOPs, 
TRASOPs, AND 0rHER EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (Sept. 20-21, 1979), at 14. 
88 [1977] PENSION & PROFIT-SHARING (P-H) 11 1061. 
•• The drafting of regulations governing the valuation of nonpublicly-traded stock for 
ESOP purposes seems to provide a perfect example of a situation in which the new Reg-
ulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-1354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (to be codified at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 601-12), should be applied. This Act recognizes that compliance with complex 
regulations can be relatively more burdensome for small businesses than for large ones, 
and requires agencies to develop alternative, simpler regulations to apply to small busi-
ness. Nowhere is the need for simplification for small businesses greater than in the valu-
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Regardless of the ultimate decision on which valuation meth-
ods should be employed, there must be a change of attitude on 
the part of the agencies overseeing the process. ESOP's are now 
subjected to "special scrutiny" by the agencies, which translates 
into "high likelihood of being audited." Such a policy naturally 
diminishes the attractiveness of the ESOP for businessmen, 
even though they may have every intention of valuing their 
stock fairly. Much more appropriate, given the intent of Con-
gress and the public policy arguments for encouraging the 
ESOP, would be a more constructive attitude towards respond-
ing to requests for guidance, and exercising leniency for past ac-
tions where good faith can be shown. An important component 
of this new attitude would be a willingness to issue "no-action" 
letters with regard to the acceptability of valuations-a practice 
the IRS now refuses to engage in. Such "no-action" letters 
would provide employers with the certainty they require in the 
conduct of a business. Another such component would be pro-
spective application of any changes in a company's valuation 
procedures which the IRS mandates after an audit, in cases 
where good faith can be shown (e.g., where the appraisal has 
been done by a truly independent professional appraiser). Pro-
spective application, rather than the current practice of assess-
ing for back taxes and penalties, would assure that businessmen 
would not suffer the consequences from sanctions, while at the 
same time assuring that proper procedures are used in the fu-
ture. In short, a "crackdown" is not the answer; what is needed 
is constructive guidance to those who do want to follow the law, 
if only they could determine what it is. 
2. Voting rights pass-through-An ESOP is set up as a trust 
in which the trustees have legal ownership of the trust assets 
and the beneficiaries have equitable ownership. As legal owners, 
the trustees of a qualified plan generally have the right to exer-
cise the voting power of the stock held by the trust, so long as 
they do so under the fiduciary standards of trust law incorpo-
ation area. A good starting point for such a discussion might center on what has been 
called an "asset value approach," similar to book value except that it uses fair market 
value of the assets instead of historical costs. This approach might also be more readily 
understandable by employees than the capitalized earnings approach where the multi-
. plier is determined with reference to market fluctuations over which employees have no 
control. An asset value approach would be inappropriate in many situations, however, 
especially in a non-capital-intensive company. But in a large class of cases which ought 
not be too difficult to define, an asset value approach would provide a useable (albeit 
imperfect) measure of value. A regulation which defined this class of cases and permitted 
use of an asset value approach therein would be consistent with the spirit of the Regula-
tory Flexibility Act. 
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rated in ERISA. 88 A special exception to this rule is made for 
the ESOP, however, and for all other "eligible individual ac-
count plans" (e.g., stock bonus and profit-sharing plans) in 
which more than ten percent of the assets are invested in em-
ployer stock.89 If a statutory ESOP or TRASOP holds publicly-
traded employer stock, each participant must be entitled to di-
rect the trustees how to vote the employer stock allocated to his 
or her account on all corporate issues. If any "eligible individual 
account plan" holds non-publicly traded employer stock, each 
participant ~ust be entitled to direct the trustees how to vote 
the stock in his or her account on corporate issues which, by 
state law or by corporate charter, must be decided by more than 
a majority of the outstanding common shares voted.70 Typically, 
such issues involve major corporate changes such as mergers or 
dissolutions. The new Small Business Employee Ownership 
Act71 and the proposed regulations thereunder72 would impose 
even more stringent standards on ESOP's seeking to qualify for 
Small Business Administration ("SBA") loan guarantees. 
ESOP's holding even non-publicly traded stock would have to 
"pass through" voting rights on all corporate issues. Of course, 
once participants receive their stock distribution in any case, 
they become the legal as well as the equitable owner of the 
stock, thereby acquiring the right to vote it in the normal 
manner. 
While there is little criticism of the pass-through requirements 
for publicly traded stock, almost no one is happy with the pre-
sent arrangement for closely-held stock. Many closely-held 
ESOP employers are adamantly opposed to any such pass-
through whatsoever. On the other hand, the GAO,78 the Trea-
sury Department,7' and others711 recommend that there be full 
voting rights passed through on all corporate issues. The issue, 
unfortunately, has become an emotional one, with repeated as-
88 ERISA, supra note 31, § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1975). 
•• I.R.C. § 401(a)(22). 
•• I.R.C. § 409A(e). 
11 Pub. L. No. 96-302, 94 Stat. 850 (1980). 
•• 45 Fed. Reg. 61,637 (1980) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. §§ 122, 202-7). 
•• GAO report, supra note 52, at 24. 
•• Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans and Employee Fringe 
Benefits of the Senate Finance Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 230 (1979) (statement of 
Daniel Halperin, Deputy Ass't Sec. for Tax Policy, Dep't of Treasury). 
•• See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to Provide 
for the Non-Recognition of Gain on the Proceeds from the Sale of Small Business Stock 
to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan if those Proceeds are Reinvested in such Stock: 
Hearings on H.R. 7604 and H.R. 7606 Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (statement of N. Kurland). 
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sertions on both sides substituting for rational analysis. Such an 
analysis is badly needed if the ESOP movement is to avoid be-
ing sidetracked by the voting rights controversy. 
The arguments in favor of voting rights pass-through are 
straightforward. Since control is a fundamental attribute of 
ownership, the proponents argue, a stock "ownership" program 
which does not convey voting rights is a fraud. If the employees 
are truly to share in the rights and responsibilities of capital 
ownership, and if a substantial portion of their capital (and thus 
of their future financial security) is to be tied up in the ESOP, 
then they should have a say in how that capital is to be man-
aged. Furthermore, the pass-through proponents argue, if one of 
the goals of the ESOP is to improve employee motivation, par-
ticipation, and productivity, then voting rights pass-through is a 
must, for without it there would be no real change in the "wage 
serr' status of the employees. Those opposed to voting rights 
pass-through, however, counter with a number of equally strong 
arguments. The right to have a say in the company cannot be 
accomplished by voting rights, they argue, in the vast majority 
of closely-held ESOP cases where the principal owners retain a 
controlling interest in the firm. Pass-through in such cases 
would be a meaningless ritual, since the outcome of the vote is 
predetermined. The opponents also dismiss the productivity im-
pact of voting rights pass-through. They point to the utter _lack 
of empirical proof that the legalistic exercise of voting rights has 
any effect on productivity,78 arguing that pass-through is only 
one of many ESOP-related steps a firm could take to enhance 
employee participation. The South Bend Lathe strike, discussed 
in the introduction, has been used as an example of what is 
wrong with the ESOP; but since the South Bend Lathe ESOP 
did in fact pass-though voting rights on all corporate issues, it is 
actually an example of a case where pass-through of voting 
rights did not improve the operation of the firm. 
The leading argument against voting rights pass-through, 
however, is the dampening effect it would have on the growth of 
the ESOP. Many owners of closely-held companies have devoted 
their careers to building up their firms and are willing to share 
the fruits of their success with their employees; but they are not 
willing to give up control of their assets. Understandably, these 
•• See Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michigan; EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (Report to 
the Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Project No. 
99-6-09433, 1979). A regression analysis of the firms studied in this project actually 
sho"'.ed a negative relationship between voting rights and profitability. 
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owners see themselves as best able to run the company, and are 
reluctant to turn over control of the assets on which their own 
personal financial health hinges to a group of often less-educated 
employees who, pre-ESOP, at least, have shown little interest in 
the success of the company. The owners fear the prospect of 
"management by committee," even though pass-through would 
not necessarily lead to this. They also recognize the potential 
conflict of interest on the part of employee-owners who have the 
power to set their own wages. Theoretically, such employees 
might choose to plow all of the company's profits into wage in-
creases, leaving nothing for the equity owners of the company 
who are not employees. 
Two other important practical considerations arise in a con-
sideration of voting rights pass-through for small, closely-held 
companies: (1) the added paperwork and procedural burdens, 
and (2) the disclosure of confidential information. The IRS has 
not yet issued regulations to interpret the statutory require- · 
ment, although proposed regulations on this subject are ex-
pected to be issued soon. In 1979, the IRS issued regulations 
governing voting rights pass-through for TRASOP's, and ESOP 
companies have been relying on them for guidance.77 The forth-
coming regulations could possibly put closely-held ESOP com-
panies in the same position as publicly-held companies in terms 
of procedural requirements for proxy voting, etc., as set forth in 
state corporate law;78 the employer or the ESOP trustees would 
also be subjected to liability for technical violations of these ex-
tensive requirements. Closely-held companies, moreover, might 
have to make the same information disclosures to their em-
ployee-owners that publicly-held companies are required by cor-
porate and federal and state securities laws to make to outside 
shareholders, and the same types of liability would attach for 
misstatements or omissions in the information disclosed. 79 The 
time, the expense, the subjection to liability and the loss of con-
fidentiality entailed by these requirements are major reasons 
why many businesses prefer to remain closely-held rather than 
"going public." If installing an ESOP resulted in these kinds of 
headaches for all closely-held business managers, then we could 
expect to see a curtailment in the number of new ESOP's~ 80 
77 Treas. Reg. § 1.46-8(d)(i) (1980). 
•• See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-333 to 33-339 (West 1960, Supp. 1980). 
•• See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1980). 
80 A recent internal survey by the ESOP Association of America, the national trade 
association of ESOP companies, indicated the intensity of employer opposition to the 
pass-through requirement. See The ESOP Association of America Newsletter, Sept., 
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The appeal of the arguments on both sides of the pass-
through question, along with the controversy and bitterness it 
has engendered, suggest the importance of searching for some 
sort of new "middle ground," providing employee-owners some 
say in management without causing the serious problems result-
ing from the present arrangement. This article does not recom-
mend any one specific compromise position; discussion of such a 
compromise, however, might begin with a consideration of one 
or more of the following elements: 
a. Reflect the lack of voting rights pass-through in the valu-
ation of the stock. Suppose Smith has a share of XYZ Corpora-
tion stock in her ESOP account which she cannot vote until she 
receives her distribution at retirement, and Jones has an identi- . 
cal share of stock which he can vote while it remains in his 
ESOP trust accunt. Arguably, what Jones has is "worth" more 
than what Smith has, since he has more extensive legal rights. If 
so, then Smith's share should have a lower valuation than 
Jones', and XYZ should receive a lesser tax deduction for its 
contribution of Smith's share to the ESOP than it does for its 
contribution of Jones' share. This analysis could resolve the 
whole pass-through controversy by simply requiring an arbitrary 
discount (e.g., fifteen to twenty percent) to be applied to the val-
uation of employer stock held by the ESOP if the plan does not 
provide for voting rights pass-through. The discount would 
apply for purposes of corporate contributions to the plan, but 
would not apply for plan transactions with third-party sellers, or 
to terminating employee sales of stock back to the company or 
the plan. ESOP's which did choose to pass through voting rights, 
however, would not be subject to the discount requirement. 
b. Pass-through voting rights on vested shares only. Most 
ESOP's have a "vesting" schedule which provides that employ-
ees .who quit before normal retirement age may have to forfeit 
some or all of the shares allocated to their account. Under 
ERISA, employees may have to participate in the ESOP for as 
long as fifteen years before they are fully vested in the shares 
allocated to their account.81 Yet voting rights pass-through to-
day is based on allocated stock, rather than on vested stock, 
which can lead to the anomaly of a participant casting votes to 
affect the future of a company using stock which will be for-
1980, at 1. Eighty-three percent of the respondents recommended that it be repealed, 
and 65 percent offered to lobby their representatives in Congress to that end. Many of 
the respondents indicated that they planned to terminate their ESOP's, or to curtail 
drastically their levels of contribution. 
•• I.R.C. § 411. 
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feited on the following day. Restricting pass-through to vested 
stock would make it somewhat more palatable to employers, 
while still giving employee-owners, especially those who have 
demonstrated a longer-term commitment to the company, a say 
in how the company should be run. 
c. Limit the issues on which voting rights must be passed-
through. This approach is actually the one being used now for 
closely-held companies, although the delineation of the issues on 
which the vote must be passed-through is not a very satisfactory 
one. Pass-through is required "with respect to a corporate mat-
ter which (by law or charter) must be decided by more than a 
majority vote of outstanding common shares voted."82 Such is-
sues are generally "major" ones, such as merger or liquidation. 
Pass-through advocates are dissatisfied because such issues come 
up rarely, if ever, in most companies; employers are dissatisfied 
because such issues are precisely the ones where their need for 
control and the danger of making a mistake are the greatest. 
Furthermore, since in some states a super-majority is required, 
these represent issues on which an ESOP with a minority inter-
est could frustrate the will of the majority. 
A different type of limitation on issues subject to pass-through 
might be more desirable for both groups. One example would be 
to permit the ESOP participants only to elect one or more board 
members, possibly (though not necessarily) in proportion to the 
number of shares held by the ESOP. The debate between the 
merits of a "republican" form of government as opposed to a 
"pure democracy" is an old one; this proposal would assume that 
the republican form is most appropriate for tlie employee owner-
ship situation. (Or at least it would assume that the republican 
form is all that should be required; companies could elect to 
open some or all issues to employee-owner vote, at their discre-
tion). Under this scenario, employee-owners would not have to 
evaluate complex and critical issues of corporate policy. They 
would simply have to choose one or more trusted, capable repre-
sentatives to the body that does deal with these issues. This pro-
posal would greatly cut down on the need for disclosure of infor-
mation and complex proxy voting procedures. It may also be less 
threatening than the present law to managements considering 
the establishment of an ESOP. And, whether the employers re-
alize it now or not, this arrangement may also provide them with 
a mechanism for receiving valuable input from their employees 
which they are not now benefiting from. 
•• I.R.C. § 409A(e). 
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d. Statutorily limit the amount of paperwork and disclosure 
required for the exercise of whatever voting rights must be 
passed-through. If closely-held ESOP companies are ever sub-
jected to the same types of paperwork, disclosure, and liability 
as publicly-held companies in the area of stock voting, the at-
tractiveness of the ESOP will be substantially diminished. Even 
the threat that such a regulation might someday be imposed cre-
ates an uncertainty which can deter a small businessman from 
setting up an ESOP. A meaningful statutory limitation on the 
amount of paperwork and disclosure required in connection with 
voting rights pass-through, standing alone, would probably not 
be enough to satisfy businessmen's objections to the ESOP, but 
in conjunction with one or more of the other proposals listed 
here, it would help. A right to inspect certain corporate records 
might be considered as an alternative to a general disclosure 
requirement. 
e. Limit pass-through to cases in which the ESOP owns a 
majority of company stock. In the typical company, pass-
through is a meaningless and costly ritual, since the principal 
owner retains more than enough stock to win every vote. A law 
recognizing this simple fact would save ESOP companies a con-
siderable amount of aggravation and expense without in any way 
depriving employees of control they might otherwise have 
exercised. 
f. Limit pass-through to stock which has been acquired with 
some form of government subsidy. The case for pass-through 
seems to be stronger when direct government subsidies, such as 
SBA or EDA loan guarantees or extra tax credits, have been 
used to enable the ESOP to acquire employer stock. A possible 
compromise might be to require full pass-through in these cases, 
but not require pass-through in other cases where the company 
only receives from the government a tax deduction for amounts 
expended to compensate its employees. 
g. Provide a more generous "grandfather clause." Many 
businessmen are particularly incensed because they established 
ESOP's under one set of laws, only to have the laws changed by 
the Revenue Act of 1978 to require voting rights pass-through 
by closely-held companies. A provision exempting all ESOP's es-
tablished before a certain date in the future (e.g., January 1, 
1985) from the mandatory pass-through requirement would sat-
isfy this particular objection. 
h. Permit certain other types of worker participation mod-
els to substitute for voting rights pass-through. Voting rights 
may not be the only way or even the best way for workers to 
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exercise the proper degree of control over their workplaces. 
Scanlon plans and Japanese-style quality control circles88 have 
been used in many companies to boost productivity and to pro-
vide workers with the dignity that advocates of pass-through 
hope to achieve. The law could be written to provide that a 
good-faith effort to establish and operate such a plan would ex-
empt an ESOP company from the pass-through requirement. 
Such a law would be harder to monitor, but the difficulty in do-
ing so would not be insurmountable. The law, moreover, would 
provide companies with more flexibility, and encourage the 
growth of another movement which seems to hold great promise 
for the American economy. The requirement of Section 505 of 
the Small Business Employee Ownership Act84 that "there will 
be periodic reviews of the role in the management of such con-
cern of employees to whose accounts stock is allocated," and the 
requirement in the proposed regulations811 interpreting this Act 
that such review be annual, are healthy and constructive steps in 
this direction. 
i. Provide for additional ESOP incentives to counterbalance 
the disincentives of voting rights pass-through. If Congress 
wants to encourage ESOP's but require pass-through all at the 
same time, they should make the ESOP so attractive that busi-
nessmen would be willing to endure voting rights pass-through 
in order to have one. There are many ways that have been dis-
cussed in which this could be done, e.g., establishing a two-
tiered Federal Reserve discount rate which would lead to the 
ready availability of a three percent prime rate for bank loans to 
ESOP's.88 Some would argue, however, that these proposals are 
meritorious in their own right and that ESOP firms should not 
have to pass-through voting rights in order to get them. 
These proposals are, of course, not the only ways in which the 
voting rights pass-through dilemma might be resolved. Some 
combination of the above proposals, however, can be developed 
to satisfy most of the concerns that have stunted the growth of 
the ESOP. The resolution to this dilemma requires a retreat 
from emotionalism on both sides and a careful crafting of an 
•• See Hearings on Quality of Production and Improvement in the Workplace, Before 
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Ways and Means Comm., 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 123-33 
(1980) (statement of William Tanaka). 
.. Supra note 26. 
"" 45 Fed. Reg. 61,638, 61,640 (1980) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. § 122.206(c)). 
18 See Kurland, Kelsonian Monetary Weapons for Fighting Inflation, reprinted in 
Hearings on H.R. 3056-Small Business Employee Ownership Act Before the Subcomm. 
on Access to Equity Capital and Business Opportunities of the House Small Business 
Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-29 (1979). 
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appropriate method by which employee-owners can exercise con-
trol over their capital. 
3. Marketability of employer stock-Another GAO criticism 
of ESOP's in closely-held companies concerned the ability of 
ESOP participants to sell their shares once they receive their 
distributions. IRC. Section 409A(h) requires that when non-pub-
licly traded stock is acquired with the proceeds of a loan to the 
ESOP, (a "leveraged ESOP"), the stock must be subject to a 
"put-option" permitting the recipient to sell it back to the em-
ployer or trust, at specified times, at fair market value. For stock 
acquired by a means other than an acquisition loan, however, no 
such put-option is required. While most companies realize that 
they have a moral obligation to repurchase unmarketable stock 
distributed to their employees, there exists no legal requirement 
for them to do so in a nonleveraged ESOP. This lack of a re-
quirement may tempt companies into offering less than fair 
market value for their employees' stock. GA O's study of thirteen 
companies did find one case in which such an unfair purchase 
occurred. 87 
GAO recommended that Congress require a put-option at fair 
market value on all nonpublicly traded stock distributed from 
an ESOP.88 This suggestion, while addressing a real problem 
with good intentions, does not fit the need precisely. The propo-
sal, on the one hand, does not go far enough. Nonpublicly traded 
stock can be distributed just as easily from a conventional stock 
bonus plan or a profit sharing plan as from an ESOP, yet the 
GAO does not suggest that any steps be taken to remedy this 
situation. Any extension of the legal requirements for marketa-
bility of stock distributed from a qualified plan should be broad 
enough to cover all such plans, not just ESOP's. Otherwise, the 
ESOP will be discriminated against vis-a-vis other types of 
plans. The GAO suggestion, on the other hand, may go too far in 
protecting the interests of the terminating employee, with the 
effect of jeopardizing the interests of the employees who remain 
in the plan. The put-option as presently constituted is not the 
only way, nor necessarily the best way, in which marketability of 
the employer stock may be assured. Before the Revenue Act of 
1978, the duration of the put-option was for a full fifteen months 
after the employees received their stock. Employees had every 
right to wait until just the right point when they could get the 
highest possible price for selling the stock back to the company 
87 GAO report, supra note 52, at 23. 
88 Id. at 27. 
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or the plan; the employer had no choice but to buy it back 
within fifteen months of the distribution. Although beneficial 
from the terminating employee's standpoint, this situation 
seemed less appealing from the company or the plan's stand-
point, since it might have to pay a higher price for the stock 
than it would prefer to. The Senate Conference Report to the 
Revenue Act of 1978 relaxed that requirement somewhat by 
breaking the time period during wich the put-option could be 
exercised into two parts. Under the terms of the Senate Report, 
the option extended for six months after the employee received 
the stock. It then lapsed, until the end of the employer's tax 
year, when the valuation of the stock would be updated. After 
being advised of this new valuation, the terminating employee 
would then be given an additional three months in which to ex-
ercise the put-option. At the end of this period, the option 
expired. 
An approach could be devised which would be both simpler 
and fairer to the employer and plan, and at the same time re-
solve the marketability problems highlighted by the GAO Re-
port. Under this approach, a terminating employee would simply 
be given the option at termination of receiving the stock or its 
fair market value (as of the most recent valuation) in cash. Ex-
isting rules permitting distributions in installments would be 
preserved in order to help ensure plan liquidity. There would be 
no extended period of time in which the terminating employees 
could "speculate" as to the direction of the stock price; they 
would simply make up their minds at the time of termination. 
A special problem arises in the case of a company entirely, or 
almost entirely, owned by its employees, which wants to remain 
that way. Such a company might well want to have the right to 
repurchase stock for itself or its plan from employees who termi-
nate, thus keeping all of the stock "in the family." Unfortu-
nately, under present ESOP regulations the company cannot be 
assured of this right. Although a right of first refusal on the 
stock distributed from the plan is permitted, this is not enough 
to provide such a guarantee. The employee cannot be compelled 
to sell his stock back to the employer or the Trust; moreover, if 
an outside party offers more for the stock than the employer or 
Trust is willing to pay, the ESOP's control position can be sub-
stantially eroded. 
Legislation along the lines of a bill introduced in the 96th 
Congress, H.R. 7848, ought to be enacted which would, in the 
case of an ESOP that owned all or substantially all of the em-
ployer's stock, permit the Trustees to decide whether stock or its 
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equivalent fair market value in cash would be distributed to the 
employee upon termination. This flexibility is presently denied 
to ESOP's on the grounds that a "stock ownership plan" should 
permit an employee, who so desires, to actually own the stock 
outright at some point. While this may be a legitimate consider-
ation in the typical ESOP which only owns a small portion of 
the company, such legitimacy fades when weighed against the 
continuity objectives of the one hundred percent ESOP-owned 
company-the law should recognize this distinction. 
B. The ESOP Improvements Act 
Unimpressed by the GAO's assertions, in July of 1980, Sena-
tor Long introduced S. 2982, the "Employee Stock Ownership 
Improvements Act of 1980."89 The bill stood little chance of pas-
sage because of the congressional preoccupation with the stale-
mate on the general tax-cut legislation, but is important none-
theless because it brought together a number of tax proposals 
that would provide an enormous stimulus to the growth of the 
ESOP movement. In a speech about his proposals on September 
26, 1980, Long flatly declared that "In the long run, I think they 
all will pass. "90 Among the more significant provisions of the bill 
are sections which would expand the TRASOP by giving em-
ployers an alternative tax credit equal to one percent of their 
covered payroll, as an alternative to the present formula of one 
percent of investments qualified for the investment tax credit; 
provide a corporate deduction for dividends paid on employee 
stock held by an ESOP or TRASOP; and provide for "tax-free 
rollover" (a deferral of taxation) on sales of small business stock 
to an ESOP or TRASOP, if the sale proceeds are reinvested in 
other small business stock within eighteen months. 
1. The payroll-based ESOP tax credit-The ESOP Im-
provements Act contains a number of provisions intended to in-
crease dramatically the incentive for business to establish 
ESOP's. The Tax Reduction Act of 1980 approved by the Senate 
Finance Committee on September 15 incorporated one of these 
provisions, the payroll-based ESOP tax credit.91 This provision 
•• S. 2982, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.; see also 118 Cong. Rec. S. 10018 (daily ed. July 18, 
1980) (statement of Sen. Long). Earlier introduced as S. 1240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
[hereinafter cited as the ESOP Improvements Act). 
80 Pens. Rep. (BNA) October 6, 1980, at A-24. 
11 SENATE FIN. COMM., REP. ON H.R. 5829, TAX REDuCTioN ACT ov 1980, S. REP. No. 
940, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 104-05 (1980). 
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would extend the benefits of the TRASOP to labor-intensive -
employers. Under present law, the TRASOP credit is tied to the 
investment tax credit. A company can take an investment tax 
credit of ten percent of its investment in certain qualified depre-
ciable property.92 It can also take an additional one percent 
credit if it transfers employer securities equal in value to one 
percent of its qualified investment to the TRASOP, or if it 
transfers an equivalent amount of cash to the TRASOP which is 
used by it to purchase employer securities. 93 The company can 
take yet another one-half percent credit, for a total credit of 
eleven and one-half percent, to the extent that employees make 
"matching" contributions to their TRASOP accounts.04 
Hundreds of companies, including many in the Fortune 1000, 
have established TRASOP's91 to take advantage of what is es-
sentially a "free gift" from the taxpayers to their employees. By 
its nature, however, a TRASOP is only useful to a company that 
can take a significant amount of investment tax credits. If the 
qualifying investments for such credits are not very large, then 
one and one-half percent of them that would go into the 
TRASOP would be so miniscule that it would not be worth the 
trouble of setting up the plan. The vast majority of American 
companies do not have enough qualifying investment to make 
the TRASOP worthwhile. 
A provision in the Tax Reduction Act of 1980 would permit · 
employers to take a tax credit based on a percentage of their 
covered payroll, as an alternative to basing the credit on qualify-
ing investment. The percentage would be one-half percent for 
1981, three-quarters percent for 1982, and one percent for 1983, 
after which the credit would expire unless extended or made 
permanent by the Congress. This would enable all employers to 
establish a TRASOP with a meaningful (though not large) 
amount of stock in each employee's account. Capital-intensive 
companies, however, would still receive more favorable treat-
ment under the tax code by retaining the option of basing their 
credit on qualifying investments, should that result in saving 
them a larger amount. The IRS has suggested that if the pay-
roll-based credit is adopted, then the investment-based credit 
81 I.R.C. §§ 38, 46. 
•• I.R.C. §§ 46(a)(2)(E), 48(n)(l)(A). 
04 1.R.C. §§ 46(a)(2)(E), 48(n)(l)(B) . 
.. Hewitt Associates, Survey of Tax Reduction Act ESOP's, April, 1979, reprinted in 
Course Materials for Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education 
Program, ESOP's, TRASOP's, and Other Employee Stock Ownership Plans (1979). 
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should be repealed. 98 This suggestion makes a good deal of 
sense. 
The tax credit approach in general seems to be a very expen-
sive way to go about encouraging employee ownership. Federal 
revenues must be decreased by one dollar for every dollar of em-
ployee ownership created. Certainly, there is a sharply defined 
upper limit on how far the federal government can go with this 
approach. The IRS estimated that a bill similar to S. 2982 could 
cost the government over $4 billion dollars annually by 1985. 97 • 
There may well be other ways in which the government can en-
courage employee ownership without incurring such a large reve-
nue loss, which would be preferable to expanding the use of tax 
credits. On the other hand, by extending a "taste of ESOP" to 
companies and workers who would otherwise not have consid-
ered it, the payroll-based credit may spread enthusiasm for the 
concept which will lead to expansion beyond the amounts for 
which the credit is available. Furthermore, if there is to be a 
general tax-cut in 1981, it is only appropriate that employee 
ownership be one of the causes benefited by the cut; the payroll-
based tax credit is certainly a direct way to go about accomplish-
ing this purpose. · 
2. Dividend deductibility-Another section of the ESOP Im-
provements Act would begin the process of re-defining the na-
ture of the American business corporation in a very healthy and 
constructive manner. The provision looks innocent enough; it 
simply provides that dividends paid on employer securities held 
by an ESOP be tax-deductible to the employer corporation if 
they are distributed currently to the participants, as is possible 
under an ESOP.98 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated 
the revenue impact of this proposal as "indeterminate but 
should be small." The philosophical implications, nonetheless, 
are enormous. In effect, this section would end double taxation 
of the corporate profits of employee owners. 
Under the Kelsonian view, the owner of capital ought to be 
entitled to receive the income his or her capital produces. Since 
the pretax annual earnings on invested capital generally exceed 
twenty percent,99 the average citizen should be able to obtain 
credit to purchase capital, repayable in a reasonably short 
period of time with the earnings created by that capital. Two 
.. Supra note 74, at 227. 
01 Id. 
.. Supra note 89. 
" L. KELso & P. HETrER, Two-FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF REALITY, supra 
note 7, at 76. 
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"filters," however, interfere with the flow of earnings back to the 
capital owner. One of these is the corporate law doctrine ex-
pressed in the landmark case of Dodge u. Ford Motor Co., 100 to 
the effect that stockholders may not generally compel corporate 
management to pay out earnings in the form of dividends. Kelso 
vehemently disagrees, maintaining that this holding undermines 
the institution of private property.101 The other "filter" blocking 
the free flow of capital earnings back to capital owners is the 
double taxation of corporate profits. Capital earnings are taxed 
at federal rates of forty-six percent plus whatever state-level 
rates apply at the corporate level; the remaining earnings wich 
pass from the corporation to its owners in the form of dividends, 
are taxed a second time at unearned income rates as high as sev-
enty percent at the federal level, plus whatever state tax rates 
apply. Since little earnings remain to repay the loan used to ac-
quire the stock, most average citizens could not obtain such a 
loan. Thus we have the historic irony of a populist-inspired tax 
system which actually serves to prevent any real broadening of 
the ownership of capital wealth. 
The ESOP as it stands today goes part of the way toward re-
storing the rights of capital owners by permitting (in essence) 
corporate tax-free financing, as discussed earlier in this article. 
Dividend deductibility would carry the process one step further, 
by eliminating the corporate level tax on capital earnings paid 
out to the capital owners. Thus, a corporation which earned one 
million dollars and paid all of it out in dividends would pay no 
corporate level tax. This would still not solve the problem cre-
ated by the Dodge doctrine, but it would be a step in the right 
direction. 102 
The IRS opposes this proposal of the ESOP Improvements 
Act on the grounds that it is a piecemeal approach to the overall 
question of the integration of corporate and personal income 
taxes now being studied, and that ESOP's should not receive 
100 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). 
1
•
1 L. KELso & M. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO, supra note 7, at 210-213. 
••• Kelso's view of the corporation is best exemplified in Subchapter U of the Internal 
Revenue Code, added by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763. 
This chapter authorizes the creation of something called a "General Stock Ownership 
Corporation," ("GSOC"). The GSOC would be a taxfree business operation, specially 
chartered by a state and owned by the citizens of that state on an individual basis, which 
is required to pay out at least ninety percent of its earnings in the form of dividends to 
its stockholders. Many non-Kelsonian economists agree that an economy where full divi-
dend payout was the norm would operate its capital markets more efficiently, rather 
than having capital earnings tied up by corporate managements with an interest in hav-
ing those earnings plowed back into their own companies. See J. BALLENTINE, EQUITY, 
EFFICIENCY, AND THE U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1980). 
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special treatment in this area. 108 The IRS position fails to recog-
nize the ownership-broadening purpose of the provision. By lim-
iting integration to ESOP's, the bill would tip the scales in favor 
of broadened ownership, in furtherance of a policy which ought 
to be central to American economic planning in the 1980's. The 
"overall integration" proposals now under consideration by the 
IRS would largely take the form of tax credits to individuals for 
dividends received; such a plan would set the existing distribu-
tion of capital wealth in concrete. Furthermore, the IRS ignores 
the important productivity impact of the proposal. If dividend 
payments to employees become "painless" they can be used as a 
sort of immediate cash bonus system tied directly to company 
earnings and to the employee's ownership stake in the company. 
More companies will be able to move toward the model pio-
neered by the Allied Plywood Corporation in Virginia, where 
workers receive generally three times as much in variable-level 
dividends and bonuses as they do in fixed wages.104 This set-up 
leads to an unusually well-motivated workforce, as well as to a 
healthier corporate financial picture because of the lower fixed 
costs. It also provides insurance against layoffs, since the com-
pany can simply cut its dividends and bonuses in lean months. 
The problem with the dividend deductibility provision in the 
bill is that it does not go far enough. For a one hundred percent 
ESOP-owned firm, the bill would be of great benefit, because it 
would become completely "painless" to pay out dividends. But 
in the much more common situation where the ESOP holds only 
a minority interest, the firm will still be reluctant to declare div-
idends because the majority of those dividends would not be de-
ductible. The company could issue a separate class of stock to 
the Trust and simply pay dividends on that class to avoid this 
problem. This is a complicated and somewhat messy solution be-
cause among other things, it would raise new problems of valu-
ing the stock. If the ESOP class of stock is more likely to receive 
dividends than the original class of stock, then it might well 
have an even higher value than the original class. How much 
higher? That would depend on the company's dividend-paying 
policies, which could change over time, thus changing the basis 
for the differing valuations between the two classes of stock. 
Further-more, outside holders of the original class of stock might 
••• Hearings on Private Pension Plans, supra note 74, at 216. 
'°' Hearings on H.R. 3056-Small Business Employee Ownership Act Before the Sub-
comm. on Access to Equity Capital and Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on 
Small Business, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979) (statement of N. Kurland). 
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become justifiably upset if they saw the employee-owners being 
paid substantial dividends while they themselves were receiving 
little or nothing. 
Another solution, which would require a change in the ESOP 
Improvements Act, would be to define an "ESOP company" as a 
company with a specified percentage of employee ownership, 
e.g., twenty percent (or, perhaps, twenty percent in 1981, to be 
increased by one percent each year thereafter for the next thirty 
years). For such companies, all dividends paid would be deducti-
ble. In addition to the advantages listed so far, this approach 
would also create a powerful incentive for existing owners to set 
up ESOP's to get dividend deductibility for their own stock. If 
Congress is not willing to go quite this far, it should at least 
consider amending the bill to provide for deductibility on stock 
distributed to terminating employees from the ESOP. 
Yet another approach would avoid use of the term "dividend" 
altogether. There is nothing to prevent a company from paying a 
quarterly or monthly cash bonus to employees, the overall size of 
which would be tied in some way to company profitability, and 
taking a business expense tax deduction for the payment. If the 
IRS, however, determined that such payments were made sub-
stantially in proportion to the stock holdings of the employees, 
even within the ESOP, then in all probability the deduction 
would be disallowed because the payments would be treated as a 
constructive (or "sham") dividend. If the Internal Revenue Code 
were amended to permit the payment of such bonuses in propor-
tion to employees' stakes in the ESOP, the double tax would be 
avoided by this somewhat circuitous route. Dividend deductibil-
ity would be a much "cleaner" approach, however. 
3. Tax free rollover-Perhaps the most significant change 
that would be made by the ESOP Improvements Act is one that 
would have only a minimal revenue impact. Section 11 of the bill 
would provide for optional nonrecognition of gain on the sale of 
small business stock to an ESOP, if within eighteen months the 
proceeds are reinvested in the stock of another small business. 
The gain would not be recognized until the stock acquired with 
such proceeds had been sold. At that time, the gain would be 
measured from the shareholder's original basis in the shares sold 
to the ESOP. The treatment would be very similar to that of a 
homeowner who sells his house and buys another, and pays no 
tax until such time as he sells a house and fails to buy 
another. 1011 
'
00 I.R.C. § 1034. 
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This bill would correct a serious injustice in the tax code 
which has created a very unhealthy situation. The principal 
owner of a closely-held small business, even a profitable one, fre-
quently experiences difficulty in finding a buyer for his shares 
when the time comes to retire or to move on to another chal-
lenge. One option open to the owner is to merge into a conglom-
erate, taking conglomerate shares in return for his own; another 
option would be to sell the owner's shares to an ESOP, as de-
scribed earlier in this article. The tax treatment of these two 
options is highly discriminatory in favor of going the conglomer-
ate route. The seller, who pays no tax at the time of this transac-
tion, gets a "tax-free rollover" as described above, and is not 
taxed until the sale of the conglomerate shares received in the 
exchange. By contrast, the owner who sells shares to an ESOP is 
taxed immediately. With such a difference in tax treatment, it is 
little wonder that there are so many more conglomerate mergers 
than there are sales to ESOP's. 
While not all conglomerate mergers are necessaily bad, the 
questions raised by the recent House Small Business Committee 
Report on Conglomerate Mergers-Their Effect on Small Busi-
ness and Local Communities106 and other studies have strongly 
indicated that, at the very least, it is bad public policy to favor 
conglomerate mergers over sales to ESOP's. The ESOP Im-
provements Act would help to correct this discrimination. And 
because it is a deferral rather than a forgiveness of taxation, it 
would also have a very small revenue impact-only about $25 
million, according to the Treasury Department. 107 A case can be 
made that this one small change would represent a quantum 
leap in the attractiveness of the ESOP to the small businessman, 
and would cause the creation of thousands of new ESOP's. The 
ability to take money out of a corporation tax-free, coupled with 
the productivity· and financing advantages of the ESOP, should 
make it almost irresistible to many open-minded small business-
men. Furthermore, the requirement that the proceeds be rein-
vested in another small business will create a large pool of capi-
tal actively searching for small businesses in which to invest, 
promoting yet another important public policy. Dollar-for-dol-
lar, this proposal may prove to be the most powerful incentive 
that Congress could fashion to broaden the ownership of Ameri-
100 H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 48. 
,.., Letter from John G. Wilkins, Deputy Dir., Off. of Tax Analysis, Off. of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, to Mr. Corey Rosen, Sen. Select Comm. on Small Business, Febru-
ary 22, 1980 (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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can capital in the 1980's. 
There are two ways in which the attractiveness of this provi-
sion could be enhanced even further. One such way would be to 
permit rollover into a Small Business Investment Company 
("SBIC") in addition to rollover into another small business. 
The SBIC108 securities would provide a high degree of liquidity 
for the investor, and the flow of funds into SBIC's would be 
channeled into an increased capital pool for small businesses. 
Another, much more ambitious approach would be to permit rol-
lover on the sale of any stock to an ESOP, if the proceeds are 
reinvested in a small business or an SBIC. Offering this advan-
tage to stockholders of America's major corporations would put 
great pressure on those corporations to form ESOP's so that 
stockholders could take advantage of the rollover provision. It 
would also generate a tremendous flow of funds into the small 
business sector. Since small business creates the vast majority of 
new American jobs, 109 this capital influx could go a long way to-
ward easing persistently high national unemployment. 
Other bills were proposed in 1980 that would extend rollover 
treatment to all sales of small business stock, with appropriate 
reinvestment of proceeds.110 Needless to say, the revenue impact 
of this proposal would be quite a bit larger-twenty-eight times 
larger, according to the Treasury Department.111 Congress 
should restrict this favorable treatment to sales to ESOP's in 
order to maximize its value. Across-the-board rollover would do 
little if anything to broaden ownership, and broadening owner-
ship, as the Joint Economic Committee has stated, must be an 
important priority in the 1980's. 
CONCLUSION 
This article discussed six proposals regarding changes in the 
law affecting ESOP's, each of which has at least some merit. It is 
important to note, however, that each of them deals with a pro-
vision of tax law-either the tax qualification requirements of 
the ESOP, or additional tax incentives that might be offered to 
companies who set one up. The simple reason for this concentra-
tion is that the champion of ESOP on Capitol Hill has been Sen. 
10
• 15 U.S.C. §§ 681-94(b) (1976). 
109 126 CONG. REc. S10020 (daily ed. July 28, 1980) (statement of Sen. Long). 
110 See, e.g., S. 653, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980). 
111 Memorandum to Joint Tax Comm. from Peter Davis (July 12, 1979) (on file with 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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Russell Long, former Chairman of the Senate's tax-writing com-
mittee. But the ESOP is not and was never intended to be pri-
marily a tax gimmick. The ESOP is much more than that-it is 
a way of restructuring the system of capital credit so that it 
works with a degree of justice and efficiency unheard of today. 
Tax laws are only one element affecting the structure of the cap-
ital credit system. Ultimately, perhaps soon, the question of 
credit and who should get it will have to be dealt with in a more 
direct manner. 
Ideally, tax laws should be designed to raise revenue, not to 
implement social policy. If it is a desirable social policy to 
restructure the system of capital credit so that more people may 
have access to it, then that policy should be implemented di-
rectly and not by tinkering with the tax laws. Part of the prob-
lem with using a more direct approach has been the mystique 
surrounding the term "credit allocation." Credit allocation is a 
pernicious doctrine, argues the Federal Reserve and others, that 
must never be allowed to creep into national policy. Yet the fact 
of the matter is that we already have a highly structured system 
for allocating capital credit. Simply put, capital credit is allo-
cated to people who have the money to pay for it. People who do 
not fit into this category, as a general rule, cannot get it. The 
allocation system is quite rigid on this point. 
Capital credit is quite different from other types of credit, e.g., 
credit used to finance the acquisition of consumer goods and ser-
vices. Unlike consumer credit, capital credit pays for itself. It 
therefore ought to be possible-even easy-to devise a method 
for extending it to people who lack the financial means to pay 
for it. Unfortunately, our present system of credit allocation 
works in the opposite direction, and channels capital credit to-
ward the people who need it the least. 
Such was not always the case. In the 19th century, when land 
represented the principal form of capital, America had a con-
scious policy of spreading access to the ownership of capital as 
broadly as possible. Had present thinking been prevalent then, 
the West would undoubtedly have been carved up into vast 
feudal estates owned by a handful of wealthy Easterners and 
Europeans. Instead, under the Homestead Act and the liberal 
land policies which preceded it, America became a nation of in-
dependent capital owning families, and achieved a prosperity 
unheard of prior to that time. An "Industrial Homestead Act" 
for the 1980's would have to focus on the central controller of 
the capital credit system, the Federal Reserve. By establishing a 
two-tiered discount rate, with a lower tier directed toward fos-
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tering broadly-owned new capital, the Federal Reserve could 
move forcefully toward a re-allocation of capital credit along 
more rational lines. 112 
What are the prospects for the ESOP, and the broadened 
ownership movement of which it is a part, in the 1980's? The 
answer is far from clear. Russell Long will no longer be chairman 
of the Senate Finance Committee, where he was able to do so 
much to promote the cause. On the other hand, President 
Reagan during the campaign on at least one occasion stated the 
position as eloquently as anyone ever has: 
Could there be anything resembling a free enterprise 
economy, if wealth and property were concentrated in 
the hands of a few, while the great majority owned little 
more than the shirts on their backs? ... Could any 
country be a land of free men and women, where the 
pride and independence of property ownership was re-
served to the few, while the majority existed in depen-
dency and servility? It should be clear to everyone that 
the nation's steadfast policy should afford every Ameri~ 
can of working age a realistic opportunity to acquire the 
ownership and control of property in a growing national 
economy. . . . The nation's next president should call 
upon Congressional leaders like Senator Long to work 
with him to ensure that all Americans have a fair chance 
to become owners of p_roperty.113 
111 See Kurland, supra note 94. 
113 Reagan-Bush Committee Memorandum, Oct. 31, 1980 (on file with University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
